Volume Two - The National Socialist Movement
Chapter XIII: German Alliance Policy after the War
The erratic manner in which the foreign affairs of the Reich were conducted
was due to a lack of sound guiding principles for the formation of practical
and useful alliances. Not only was this state of affairs continued after
the Revolution, but it became even worse.
For the confused state of our political ideas in general before the War may
be looked upon as the chief cause of our defective statesmanship; but in
the post-War period this cause must be attributed to a lack of honest intentions.
It was natural that those parties who had fully achieved their destructive
purpose by means of the Revolution should feel that it would not serve their
interests if a policy of alliances were adopted which must ultimately result
in the restoration of a free German State. A development in this direction
would not be in conformity with the purposes of the November crime. It would
have interrupted and indeed put an end to the internationalization of German
national economy and German Labour. But what was feared most of all was that
a successful effort to make the Reich independent of foreign countries might
have an influence in domestic politics which one day would turn out disastrous
for those who now hold supreme power in the government of the Reich. One
cannot imagine the revival of a nation unless that revival be preceded by
a process of nationalization. Conversely, every important success in the
field of foreign politics must call forth a favourable reaction at home.
Experience proves that every struggle for liberty increases the national
sentiment and national self-consciousness and therewith gives rise to a keener
sensibility towards anti-national elements and tendencies. A state of things,
and persons also, that may be tolerated and even pass unnoticed in times
of peace will not only become the object of aversion when national enthusiasm
is aroused but will even provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns
out disastrous for them. In this connection we may recall the spy-scare that
became prevalent when the war broke out, when human passion suddenly manifested
itself to such a heightened degree as to lead to the most brutal persecutions,
often without any justifiable grounds, although everybody knew that the danger
resulting from spies is greater during the long periods of peace; but, for
obvious reasons, they do not then attract a similar amount of public attention.
For this reason the subtle instinct of the State parasites who came to the
surface of the national body through the November happenings makes them feel
at once that a policy of alliances which would restore the freedom of our
people and awaken national sentiment might possibly ruin their own criminal
existence.
Thus we may explain the fact that since 1918 the men who have held the reins
of government adopted an entirely negative attitude towards foreign affairs
and that the business of the State has been almost constantly conducted in
a systematic way against the interests of the German nation. For that which
at first sight seemed a matter of chance proved, on closer examination, to
be a logical advance along the road which was first publicly entered upon
by the November Revolution of 1918.
Undoubtedly a distinction ought to be made between (1) the responsible
administrators of our affairs of State, or rather those who ought to be
responsible; (2) the average run of our parliamentary politicasters, and
(3) the masses of our people, whose sheepish docility corresponds to their
want of intelligence.
The first know what they want. The second fall into line with them, either
because they have been already schooled in what is afoot or because they
have not the courage to take an uncompromising stand against a course which
they know and feel to be detrimental. The third just submit to it because
they are too stupid to understand.
While the German National Socialist Labour Party was only a small and practically
unknown society, problems of foreign policy could have only a secondary
importance in the eyes of many of its members. This was the case especially
because our movement has always proclaimed the principle, and must proclaim
it, that the freedom of the country in its foreign relations is not a gift
that will be bestowed upon us by Heaven or by any earthly Powers, but can
only be the fruit of a development of our inner forces. We must first root
out the causes which led to our collapse and we must eliminate all those
who are profiting by that collapse. Then we shall be in a position to take
up the fight for the restoration of our freedom in the management of our
foreign relations.
It will be easily understood therefore why we did not attach so much importance
to foreign affairs during the early stages of our young movement, but preferred
to concentrate on the problem of internal reform.
But when the small and insignificant society expanded and finally grew too
large for its first framework, the young organization assumed the importance
of a great association and we then felt it incumbent on us to take a definite
stand on problems regarding the development of a foreign policy. It was necessary
to lay down the main lines of action which would not only be in accord with
the fundamental ideas of our Weltanschhauung but would actually be
an expansion of it in the practical world of foreign affairs.
Just because our people have had no political education in matters concerning
our relations abroad, it was necessary to teach the leaders in the various
sections of our movement, and also the masses of the people, the chief principles
which ought to guide the development of our foreign relations. That was one
of the first tasks to be accomplished in order to prepare the ground for
the practical carrying out of a foreign policy which would win back the
independence of the nation in managing its external affairs and thus restore
the real sovereignty of the Reich.
The fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in mind
when studying this question is that foreign policy is only a means to an
end and that the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own people.
Every problem in foreign politics must be considered from this point of view,
and this point of view alone. Shall such and such a solution prove advantageous
to our people now or in the future, or will it injure their interests? That
is the question.
This is the sole preoccupation that must occupy our minds in dealing with
a question. Party politics, religious considerations, humanitarian ideals
– all such and all other preoccupations must absolutely give way to
this.
Before the War the purpose to which German foreign policy should have been
devoted was to assure the supply of material necessities for the maintenance
of our people and their children. And the way should have been prepared which
would lead to this goal. Alliances should have been established which would
have proved beneficial to us from this point of view and would have brought
us the necessary auxiliary support. The task to be accomplished is the same
today, but with this difference: In pre-War times it was a question of caring
for the maintenance of the German people, backed up by the power which a
strong and independent State then possessed, but our task today is to make
our nation powerful once again by re-establishing a strong and independent
State. The re-establishment of such a State is the prerequisite and necessary
condition which must be fulfilled in order that we may be able subsequently
to put into practice a foreign policy which will serve to guarantee the existence
of our people in the future, fulfilling their needs and furnishing them with
those necessities of life which they lack. In other words, the aim which
Germany ought to pursue today in her foreign policy is to prepare the way
for the recovery of her liberty tomorrow. In this connection there is a
fundamental principle which we must keep steadily before our minds. It is
this: The possibility of winning back the independence of a nation is not
absolutely bound up with the question of territorial reintegration but it
will suffice if a small remnant, no matter how small, of this nation and
State will exist, provided it possesses the necessary independence to become
not only the vehicle of' the common spirit of the whole people but also to
prepare the way for the military fight to reconquer the nation's liberty.
When a people who amount to a hundred million souls tolerate the yoke of
common slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to their State
from being broken up and divided, that is worse than if such a State and
such a people were dismembered while one fragment still retained its complete
independence. Of course, the natural proviso here is that this fragment must
be inspired with a consciousness of the solemn duty that devolves upon it,
not only to proclaim persistently the inviolable unity of its spiritual and
cultural life with that of its detached members but also to prepare the means
that are necessary for the military conflict which will finally liberate
and re-unite the fragments that are suffering under oppression.
One must also bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost districts
which were formerly parts of the State, both ethnically and politically,
must in the first instance be a question of winning back political power
and independence for the motherland itself, and that in such cases the special
interests of the lost districts must be uncompromisingly regarded as a matter
of secondary importance in the face of the one main task, which is to win
back the freedom of the central territory. For the detached and oppressed
fragments of a nation or an imperial province cannot achieve their liberation
through the expression of yearnings and protests on the part of the oppressed
and abandoned, but only when the portion which has more or less retained
its sovereign independence can resort to the use of force for the purpose
of reconquering those territories that once belonged to the common fatherland.
Therefore, in order to reconquer lost territories the first condition to
be fulfilled is to work energetically for the increased welfare and reinforcement
of the strength of that portion of the State which has remained over after
the partition. Thus the unquenchable yearning which slumbers in the hearts
of the people must be awakened and restrengthened by bringing new forces
to its aid, so that when the hour comes all will be devoted to the one purpose
of liberating and uniting the whole people. Therefore, the interests of the
separated territories must be subordinated to the one purpose. That one purpose
must aim at obtaining for the central remaining portion such a measure of
power and might that will enable it to enforce its will on the hostile will
of the victor and thus redress the wrong. For flaming protests will not restore
the oppressed territories to the bosom of a common Reich. That can be done
only through the might of the sword.
The forging of this sword is a work that has to be done through the domestic
policy which must be adopted by a national government. To see that the work
of forging these arms is assured, and to recruit the men who will bear them,
that is the task of the foreign policy.
In the first volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our policy
of alliances before the War. There were four possible ways to secure the
necessary foodstuffs for the maintenance of our people. Of these ways the
fourth, which was the most unfavourable, was chosen. Instead of a sound policy
of territorial expansion in Europe, our rulers embarked on a policy of colonial
and trade expansion. That policy was all the more mistaken inasmuch as they
presumed that in this way the danger of an armed conflict would be averted.
The result of the attempt to sit on many stools at the same time might have
been foreseen. It let us fall to the ground in the midst of them all. And
the World War was only the last reckoning presented to the Reich to pay for
the failure of its foreign policy.
The right way that should have been taken in those days was the third way
I indicated: namely, to increase the strength of the Reich as a Continental
Power by the acquisition of new territory in Europe. And at the same time
a further expansion, through the subsequent acquisition of colonial territory,
might thus be brought within the range of practical politics. Of course,
this policy could not have been carried through except in alliance with England,
or by devoting such abnormal efforts to the increase of military force and
armament that, for forty or fifty years, all cultural undertakings would
have to be completely relegated to the background. This responsibility might
very well have been undertaken. The cultural importance of a nation is almost
always dependent on its political freedom and independence. Political freedom
is a prerequisite condition for the existence, or rather the creation, of
great cultural undertakings. Accordingly no sacrifice can be too great when
there is question of securing the political freedom of a nation. What might
have to be deducted from the budget expenses for cultural purposes, in order
to meet abnormal demands for increasing the military power of the State,
can be generously paid back later on. Indeed, it may be said that after a
State has concentrated all its resources in one effort for the purpose of
securing its political independence a certain period of ease and renewed
equilibrium sets in. And it often happens that the cultural spirit of the
nation, which had been heretofore cramped and confined, now suddenly blooms
forth. Thus Greece experienced the great Periclean era after the miseries
it had suffered during the Persian Wars. And the Roman Republic turned its
energies to the cultivation of a higher civilization when it was freed from
the stress and worry of the Punic Wars.
Of course, it could not be expected that a parliamentary majority of feckless
and stupid people would be capable of deciding on such a resolute policy
for the absolute subordination of all other national interests to the one
sole task of preparing for a future conflict of arms which would result in
establishing the security of the State. The father of Frederick the Great
sacrificed everything in order to be ready for that conflict; but the fathers
of our absurd parliamentarian democracy, with the Jewish hall-mark, could
not do it.
That is why, in pre-War times, the military preparation necessary to enable
us to conquer new territory in Europe was only very mediocre, so that it
was difficult to obtain the support of really helpful allies.
Those who directed our foreign affairs would not entertain even the idea
of systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan for the acquisition
of territory in Europe. And by preferring a policy of colonial and trade
expansion, they sacrificed the alliance with England, which was then possible.
At the same time they neglected to seek the support of Russia, which would
have been a logical proceeding. Finally they stumbled into the World War,
abandoned by all except the ill-starred Habsburgs.
The characteristic of our present foreign policy is that it follows no
discernible or even intelligible lines of action. Whereas before the War
a mistake was made in taking the fourth way that I have mentioned, and this
was pursued only in a halfhearted manner, since the Revolution not even the
sharpest eye can detect any way that is being followed. Even more than before
the War, there is absolutely no such thing as a systematic plan, except the
systematic attempts that are made to destroy the last possibility of a national
revival.
If we make an impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe today
as far as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one another, we
shall arrive at the following results:
For the past three hundred years the history of our Continent has been definitely
determined by England's efforts to keep the European States opposed to one
another in an equilibrium of forces, thus assuring the necessary protection
of her own rear while she pursued the great aims of British world-policy.
The traditional tendency of British diplomacy ever since the reign of Queen
Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every possible means to prevent
any one Power from attaining a preponderant position over the other European
Powers and, if necessary, to break that preponderance by means of armed
intervention. The only parallel to this has been the tradition of the Prussian
Army. England has made use of various forces to carry out its purpose, choosing
them according to the actual situation or the task to be faced; but the will
and determination to use them has always been the same. The more difficult
England's position became in the course of history the more the British Imperial
Government considered it necessary to maintain a condition of political paralysis
among the various European States, as a result of their mutual rivalries.
When the North American colonies obtained their political independence it
became still more necessary for England to use every effort to establish
and maintain the defence of her flank in Europe. In accordance with this
policy she reduced Spain and the Netherlands to the position of inferior
naval Powers. Having accomplished this, England concentrated all her forces
against the increasing strength of France, until she brought about the downfall
of Napoleon Bonaparte and therewith destroyed the military hegemony of France,
which was the most dangerous rival that England had to fear.
The change of attitude in British statesmanship towards Germany took place
only very slowly, not only because the German nation did not represent an
obvious danger for England as long as it lacked national unification, but
also because public opinion in England, which had been directed to other
quarters by a system of propaganda that had been carried out for a long time,
could be turned to a new direction only by slow degrees. In order to reach
the proposed ends the calmly reflecting statesman had to bow to popular
sentiment, which is the most powerful motive-force and is at the same time
the most lasting in its energy. When the statesman has attained one of his
ends, he must immediately turn his thoughts to others; but only by degrees
and the slow work of propaganda can the sentiment of the masses be shaped
into an instrument for the attainment of the new aims which their leaders
have decided on.
As early as 1870-71 England had decided on the new stand it would take.
On certain occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused by the
growing influence of America in the commercial markets of the world and also
by the increasing political power of Russia; but, unfortunately, Germany
did not take advantage of these and, therefore, the original tendency of
British diplomacy was only reinforced.
England looked upon Germany as a Power which was of world importance commercially
and politically and which, partly because of its enormous industrial development,
assumed such threatening proportions that the two countries already contended
against one another in the same sphere and with equal energy. The so-called
peaceful conquest of the world by commercial enterprise, which, in the eyes
of those who governed our public affairs at that time, represented the highest
peak of human wisdom, was just the thing that led English statesmen to adopt
a policy of resistance. That this resistance assumed the form of an organized
aggression on a vast scale was in full conformity with a type of statesmanship
which did not aim at the maintenance of a dubious world peace but aimed at
the consolidation of British world-hegemony. In carrying out this policy,
England allied herself with those countries which had a definite military
importance. And that was in keeping with her traditional caution in estimating
the power of her adversary and also in recognizing her own temporary weakness.
That line of conduct cannot be called unscrupulous; because such a comprehensive
organization for war purposes must not be judged from the heroic point of
view but from that of expediency. The object of a diplomatic policy must
not be to see that a nation goes down heroically but rather that it survives
in a practical way. Hence every road that leads to this goal is opportune
and the failure to take it must be looked upon as a criminal neglect of duty.
When the German Revolution took place England's fears of a German world hegemony
came to a satisfactory end.
From that time it was not an English interest to see Germany totally cancelled
from the geographic map of Europe. On the contrary, the astounding collapse
which took place in November 1918 found British diplomacy confronted with
a situation which at first appeared untenable.
For four-and-a-half years the British Empire had fought to break the presumed
preponderance of a Continental Power. A sudden collapse now happened which
removed this Power from the foreground of European affairs. That collapse
disclosed itself finally in the lack of even the primordial instinct of
self-preservation, so that European equilibrium was destroyed within forty-eight
hours. Germany was annihilated and France became the first political Power
on the Continent of Europe.
The tremendous propaganda which was carried on during this war for the purpose
of encouraging the British public to stick it out to the end aroused all
the primitive instincts and passions of the populace and was bound eventually
to hang as a leaden weight on the decisions of British statesmen. With the
colonial, economical and commercial destruction of Germany, England's war
aims were attained. Whatever went beyond those aims was an obstacle to the
furtherance of British interests. Only the enemies of England could profit
by the disappearance of Germany as a Great Continental Power in Europe. In
November 1918, however, and up to the summer of 1919, it was not possible
for England to change its diplomatic attitude; because during the long war
it had appealed, more than it had ever done before, to the feelings of the
populace. In view of the feeling prevalent among its own people, England
could not change its foreign policy; and another reason which made that
impossible was the military strength to which other European Powers had now
attained. France had taken the direction of peace negotiations into her own
hands and could impose her law upon the others. During those months of
negotiations and bargaining the only Power that could have altered the course
which things were taking was Germany herself; but Germany was torn asunder
by a civil war, and her so-called statesmen had declared themselves ready
to accept any and every dictate imposed on them.
Now, in the comity of nations, when one nation loses its instinct for
self-preservation and ceases to be an active member it sinks to the level
of an enslaved nation and its territory will have to suffer the fate of a
colony.
To prevent the power of France from becoming too great, the only form which
English negotiations could take was that of participating in France's lust
for aggrandizement.
As a matter of fact, England did not attain the ends for which she went to
war. Not only did it turn out impossible to prevent a Continental Power from
obtaining a preponderance over the ratio of strength in the Continental State
system of Europe, but a large measure of preponderance had been obtained
and firmly established.
In 1914 Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between two
countries, one of which had equal military forces at its disposal and the
other had greater military resources. Then there was England's overwhelming
supremacy at sea. France and Russia alone hindered and opposed the excessive
aggrandizement of Germany. The unfavourable geographical situation of the
Reich, from the military point of view, might be looked upon as another
coefficient of security against an exaggerated increase of German power.
From the naval point of view, the configuration of the coast-line was
unfavourable in case of a conflict with England. And though the maritime
frontier was short and cramped, the land frontier was widely extended and
open.
France's position is different today. It is the first military Power without
a serious rival on the Continent. It is almost entirely protected by its
southern frontier against Spain and Italy. Against Germany it is safeguarded
by the prostrate condition of our country. A long stretch of its coast-line
faces the vital nervous system of the British Empire. Not only could French
aeroplanes and long-range batteries attack the vital centres of the British
system, but submarines can threaten the great British commercial routes.
A submarine campaign based on France's long Atlantic coast and on the European
and North African coasts of the Mediterranean would have disastrous consequences
for England.
Thus the political results of the war to prevent the development of German
power was the creation of a French hegemony on the Continent. The military
result was the consolidation of France as the first Continental Power and
the recognition of American equality on the sea. The economic result was
the cession of great spheres of British interests to her former allies and
associates.
The Balkanization of Europe, up to a certain degree, was desirable and indeed
necessary in the light of the traditional policy of Great Britain, just as
France desired the Balkanization of Germany.
What England has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent
any one Continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of world
importance. Therefore England wishes to maintain a definite equilibrium of
forces among the European States – for this equilibrium seems a necessary
condition of England's world-hegemony.
What France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent
Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore France wants to maintain
a system of small German States whose forces would balance one another and
over which there should be no central government. Then, by acquiring possession
of the left bank of the Rhine, she would have fulfilled the pre-requisite
conditions for the establishment and security of her hegemony in Europe.
The final aims of French diplomacy must be in perpetual opposition to the
final tendencies of British statesmanship.
Taking these considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates
the possibilities that exist for Germany to find allies must come to the
conclusion that there remains no other way of forming an alliance except
to approach England. The consequences of England's war policy were and are
disastrous for Germany. However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that,
as things stand today, the necessary interests of England no longer demand
the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British diplomacy must tend
more and more, from year to year, towards curbing France's unbridled lust
after hegemony. Now, a policy of alliances cannot be pursued by bearing past
grievances in mind, but it can be rendered fruitful by taking account of
past experiences. Experience should have taught us that alliances formed
for negative purposes suffer from intrinsic weakness. The destinies of nations
can be welded together only under the prospect of a common success, of common
gain and conquest, in short, a common extension of power for both contracting
parties.
The ignorance of our people on questions of foreign politics is clearly
demonstrated by the reports in the daily Press which talk about "friendship
towards Germany" on the part of one or the other foreign statesman, whereby
this professed friendship is taken as a special guarantee that such persons
will champion a policy that will be advantageous to our people. That kind
of talk is absurd to an incredible degree. It means speculating on the
unparalleled simplicity of the average German philistine when he comes to
talking politics. There is not any British, American, or Italian statesman
who could ever be described as 'pro-German'. Every Englishman must naturally
be British first of all. The same is true of every American. And no Italian
statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not pro-Italian.
Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances with foreign nations on the
basis of a pro-German feeling among the statesmen of other countries is either
an ass or a deceiver. The necessary condition for linking together the destinies
of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual sympathy, but rather the prospect
of advantages accruing to the contracting parties. It is true that a British
statesman will always follow a pro-British and not a pro-German policy; but
it is also true that certain definite interests involved in this pro-British
policy may coincide on various grounds with German interests. Naturally that
can be so only to a certain degree and the situation may one day be completely
reversed. But the art of statesmanship is shown when at certain periods there
is question of reaching a certain end and when allies are found who must
take the same road in order to defend their own interests.
The practical application of these principles at the present time must depend
on the answer given to the following questions: What States are not vitally
interested in the fact that, by the complete abolition of a German Central
Europe, the economic and military power of France has reached a position
of absolute hegemony? Which are the States that, in consideration of the
conditions which are essential to their own existence and in view of the
tradition that has hitherto been followed in conducting their foreign policy,
envisage such a development as a menace to their own future?
Finally, we must be quite clear on the following point: France is and will
remain the implacable enemy of Germany. It does not matter what Governments
have ruled or will rule in France, whether Bourbon or Jacobin, Napoleonic
or Bourgeois-Democratic, Clerical Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign
policy will always be directed towards acquiring possession of the Rhine
frontier and consolidating France's position on this river by disuniting
and dismembering Germany.
England did not want Germany to be a world Power. France desired that there
should be no Power called Germany. Therefore there was a very essential
difference. To-day we are not fighting for our position as a World-Power
but only for the existence of our country, for national unity and the daily
bread of our children. Taking this point of view into consideration, only
two States remain to us as possible allies in Europe - England and Italy.
England is not pleased to see a France on whose military power there is no
check in Europe, so that one day she might undertake the support of a policy
which in some way or other might come into conflict with British interests.
Nor can England be pleased to see France in possession of such enormous coal
and iron mines in Western Europe as would make it possible for her one day
to play a role in world-commerce which might threaten danger to British
interests. Moreover, England can never be pleased to see a France whose political
position on the Continent, owing to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe,
seems so absolutely assured that she is not only able to resume a French
world-policy on great lines but would even find herself compelled to do so.
The bombs which were once dropped by the Zeppelins might be multiplied by
the thousand every night. The military predominance of France is a weight
that presses heavily on the hearts of the World Empire over which Great Britain
rules.
Nor can Italy desire, nor will she desire, any further strengthening of
France's power in Europe. The future of Italy will be conditioned by the
development of events in the Mediterranean and by the political situation
in the area surrounding that sea. The reason that led Italy into the War
was not a desire to contribute towards the aggrandizement of France but rather
to deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow. Any further increase of
France's power on the Continent would hamper the development of Italy's future,
and Italy does not deceive herself by thinking that racial kindred between
the nations will in any way eliminate rivalries.
Serious and impartial consideration proves that it is these two States, Great
Britain and Italy, whose natural interests not only do not contrast with
the conditions essential to the existence of the German nation but are identical
with them, to a certain extent.
But when we consider the possibilities of alliances we must be careful not
to lose sight of three factors. The first factor concerns ourselves; the
other two concern the two States I have mentioned.
Is it at all possible to conclude an alliance with Germany as it is today?
Can a Power which would enter into an alliance for the purpose of securing
assistance in an effort to carry out its own offensive aims – can such
a Power form an alliance with a State whose rulers have for years long presented
a spectacle of deplorable incompetence and pacifist cowardice and where the
majority of the people, blinded by democratic and Marxist teachings, betray
the interests of their own people and country in a manner that cries to Heaven
for vengeance? As things stand today, can any Power hope to establish useful
relations and hope to fight together for the furtherance of their common
interests with this State which manifestly has neither the will nor the courage
to move a finger even in the defence of its bare existence? Take the case
of a Power for which an alliance must be much more than a pact to guarantee
a state of slow decomposition, such as happened with the old and disastrous
Triple Alliance. Can such a Power associate itself for life or death with
a State whose most characteristic signs of activity consist of a rampant
servility in external relations and a scandalous repression of the national
spirit at home? Can such a Power be associated with a State in which there
is nothing of greatness, because its whole policy does not deserve it? Or
can alliances be made with Governments which are in the hands of men who
are despised by their own fellow-citizens and consequently are not respected
abroad?
No. A self-respecting Power which expects something more from alliances than
commissions for greedy Parliamentarians will not and cannot enter into an
alliance with our present-day Germany. Our present inability to form alliances
furnishes the principle and most solid basis for the combined action of the
enemies who are robbing us. Because Germany does not defend itself in any
other way except by the flamboyant protests of our parliamentarian elect,
there is no reason why the rest of the world should take up the fight in
our defence. And God does not follow the principle of granting freedom to
a nation of cowards, despite all the implications of our 'patriotic'
associations. Therefore, for those States which have not a direct interest
in our annihilation no other course remains open except to participate in
France's campaign of plunder, at least to make it impossible for the strength
of France to be exclusively aggrandized thereby.
In the second place, we must not forget that among the nations which were
formerly our enemies mass-propaganda has turned the opinions and feelings
of large sections of the population in a fixed direction. When for years
long a foreign nation has been presented to the public as a horde of
'Huns', 'Robbers', 'Vandals', etc., they cannot suddenly be presented as
something different, and the enemy of yesterday cannot be recommended as
the ally of tomorrow.
But the third factor deserves greater attention, since it is of essential
importance for establishing future alliances in Europe.
From the political point of view it is not in the interests of Great Britain
that Germany should be ruined even still more, but such a proceeding would
be very much in the interests of the international money-markets manipulated
by the Jew. The cleavage between the official, or rather traditional, British
statesmanship and the controlling influence of the Jew on the money-markets
is nowhere so clearly manifested as in the various attitudes taken towards
problems of British foreign policy. Contrary to the interests and welfare
of the British State, Jewish finance demands not only the absolute economic
destruction of Germany but its complete political enslavement. The
internationalization of our German economic system, that is to say, the
transference of our productive forces to the control of Jewish international
finance, can be completely carried out only in a State that has been politically
Bolshevized. But the Marxist fighting forces, commanded by international
and Jewish stock-exchange capital, cannot finally smash the national resistance
in Germany without friendly help from outside. For this purpose French armies
would first have to invade and overcome the territory of the German Reich
until a state of international chaos would set in, and then the country would
have to succumb to Bolshevik storm troops in the service of Jewish international
finance.
Hence it is that at the present time the Jew is the great agitator for the
complete destruction of Germany. Whenever we read of attacks against Germany
taking place in any part of the world the Jew is always the instigator. In
peace-time, as well as during the War, the Jewish-Marxist stock-exchange
Press systematically stirred up hatred against Germany, until one State after
another abandoned its neutrality and placed itself at the service of the
world coalition, even against the real interests of its own people.
The Jewish way of reasoning thus becomes quite clear. The Bolshevization
of Germany, that is to say, the extermination of the patriotic and national
German intellectuals, thus making it possible to force German Labour to bear
the yoke of international Jewish finance – that is only the overture
to the movement for expanding Jewish power on a wider scale and finally
subjugating the world to its rule. As has so often happened in history, Germany
is the chief pivot of this formidable struggle. If our people and our State
should fall victims to these oppressors of the nations, lusting after blood
and money, the whole earth would become the prey of that hydra. Should Germany
be freed from its grip, a great menace for the nations of the world would
thereby be eliminated.
It is certain that Jewry uses all its subterranean activities not only for
the purpose of keeping alive old national enmities against Germany but even
to spread them farther and render them more acute wherever possible. It is
no less certain that these activities are only very partially in keeping
with the true interests of the nations among whose people the poison is spread.
As a general principle, Jewry carries on its campaign in the various countries
by the use of arguments that are best calculated to appeal to the mentality
of the respective nations and are most likely to produce the desired results;
for Jewry knows what the public feeling is in each country. Our national
stock has been so much adulterated by the mixture of alien elements that,
in its fight for power, Jewry can make use of the more or less
'cosmopolitan' circles which exist among us, inspired by the pacifist and
international ideologies. In France they exploit the well-known and accurately
estimated chauvinistic spirit. In England they exploit the commercial and
world-political outlook. In short, they always work upon the essential
characteristics that belong to the mentality of each nation. When they have
in this way achieved a decisive influence in the political and economic spheres
they can drop the limitations which their former tactics necessitated, now
disclosing their real intentions and the ends for which they are fighting.
Their work of destruction now goes ahead more quickly, reducing one State
after another to a mass of ruins on which they will erect the everlasting
and sovereign Jewish Empire.
In England, and in Italy, the contrast between the better kind of solid
statesmanship and the policy of the Jewish stock-exchange often becomes
strikingly evident.
Only in France there exists today more than ever before a profound accord
between the views of the stock-exchange, controlled by the Jews, and the
chauvinistic policy pursued by French statesmen. This identity of views
constitutes an immense, danger for Germany. And it is just for this reason
that France is and will remain by far the most dangerous enemy. The French
people, who are becoming more and more obsessed by negroid ideas, represent
a threatening menace to the existence of the white race in Europe, because
they are bound up with the Jewish campaign for world-domination. For the
contamination caused by the influx of negroid blood on the Rhine, in the
very heart of Europe, is in accord with the sadist and perverse lust for
vengeance on the part of the hereditary enemy of our people, just as it suits
the purpose of the cool calculating Jew who would use this means of introducing
a process of bastardization in the very centre of the European Continent
and, by infecting the white race with the blood of an inferior stock, would
destroy the foundations of its independent existence.
France's activities in Europe today, spurred on by the French lust for vengeance
and systematically directed by the Jew, are a criminal attack against the
life of the white race and will one day arouse against the French people
a spirit of vengeance among a generation which will have recognized the original
sin of mankind in this racial pollution.
As far as concerns Germany, the danger which France represents involves the
duty of relegating all sentiment to a subordinate place and extending the
hand to those who are threatened with the same menace and who are not willing
to suffer or tolerate France's lust for hegemony.
For a long time yet to come there will be only two Powers in Europe with
which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance. These Powers
are Great Britain and Italy.
If we take the trouble to cast a glance backwards on the way in which German
foreign policy has been conducted since the Revolution we must, in view of
the constant and incomprehensible acts of submission on the part. of our
governments, either lose heart or become fired with rage and take up the
cudgels against such a regime. Their way of acting cannot be attributed to
a want of understanding, because what seemed to every thinking man to be
inconceivable was accomplished by the leaders of the November parties with
their Cyclopean intellects. They bowed to France and begged her favour. Yes,
during all these recent years, with the touching simplicity of incorrigible
visionaries, they went on their knees to France again and again. They perpetuaily
wagged their tails before the Grande Nation. And in each trick-o'-the-loop
which the French hangmen performed with his rope they recognized a visible
change of feeling. Our real political wire-pullers never shared in this absurd
credulity. The idea of establishing a friendship with France was for them
only a means of thwarting every attempt on Germany's part to adopt a practical
policy of alliances. They had no illusions about French aims or those of
the men behind the scenes in France. What induced them to take up such an
attitude and to act as if they honestly believed that the fate of Germany
could possibly be changed in this way was the cool calculation that if this
did not happen our people might take the reins into their own hands and choose
another road.
Of course it is difficult for us to propose England as our possible ally
in the future. Our Jewish Press has always been adept in concentrating hatred
against England particularly. And many of our good German simpletons perch
on these branches which the Jews have limed to capture them. They babble
about a restoration of German sea power and protest against the robbery of
our colonies. Thus they furnish material which the contriving Jew transmits
to his clansmen in England, so that it can be used there for purposes of
practical propaganda. For our simple-minded bourgeoisie who indulge in politics
can take in only little by little the idea that today we have not to fight
for 'sea-power' and such things. Even before the War it was absurd to direct
the national energies of Germany towards this end without first having secured
our position in Europe. Such a hope today reaches that peak of absurdity
which may be called criminal in the domain of politics.
Often one becomes really desperate on seeing how the Jewish wire-pullers
succeeded in concentrating the attention of the people on things which are
only of secondary importance today, They incited the people to demonstrations
and protests while at the same time France was tearing our nation asunder
bit by bit and systematically removing the very foundations of our national
independence.
In this connection I have to think of the Wooden Horse in the riding of which
the Jew showed extraordinary skill during these years. I mean South Tyrol.
Yes, South Tyrol. The reason why I take up this question here is just because
I want to call to account that shameful canaille who relied on the ignorance
and short memories of large sections of our people and stimulated a national
indignation which is as foreign to the real character of our parliamentary
impostors as the idea of respect for private property is to a magpie.
I should like to state here that I was one of those who, at the time when
the fate of South Tyrol was being decided – that is to say, from August
1914 to November 1918 – took my place where that country also could
have been effectively defended, namely, in the Army. I did my share in the
fighting during those years, not merely to save South Tyrol from being lost
but also to save every other German province for the Fatherland.
The parliamentary sharpers did not take part in that combat. The whole canaille
played party politics. On the other hand, we carried on the fight in the
belief that a victorious issue of the War would enable the German nation
to keep South Tyrol also; but the loud-mouthed traitor carried on a seditious
agitation against such a victorious issue, until the fighting Siegfried succumbed
to the dagger plunged in his back. It was only natural that the inflammatory
and hypocritical speeches of the elegantly dressed parliamentarians on the
Vienna Rathaus Platz or in front of the Feldherrnhalle in Munich could not
save South Tyrol for Germany. That could be done only by the fighting battalions
at the Front. Those who broke up that fighting front betrayed South Tyrol,
as well as the other districts of Germany.
Anyone who thinks that the South Tyrol question can be solved today by protests
and manifestations and processions organized by various associations is either
a humbug or merely a German philistine.
In this regard it must be quite clearly understood that we cannot get back
the territories we have lost if we depend on solemn imprecations before the
throne of the Almighty God or on pious hopes in a League of Nations, but
only by the force of arms.
Therefore the only remaining question is: Who is ready to take up arms for
the restoration of the lost territories?
As far as concerns myself personally, I can state with a good conscience
that I would have courage enough to take part in a campaign for the reconquest
of South Tyrol, at the head of parliamentarian storm battalions consisting
of parliamentarian gasconaders and all the party leaders, also the various
Councillors of State. Only the Devil knows whether I might have the luck
of seeing a few shells suddenly burst over this 'burning' demonstration of
protest. I think that if a fox were to break into a poultry yard his presence
would not provoke such a helter-skelter and rush to cover as we should witness
in the band of 'protesters'.
The vilest part of it all is that these talkers themselves do not believe
that anything can be achieved in this way. Each one of them knows very well
how harmless and ineffective their whole pretence is. They do it only because
it is easier now to babble about the restoration of South Tyrol than to fight
for its preservation in days gone by.
Each one plays the part that he is best capable of playing in life. In those
days we offered our blood. To-day these people are engaged in whetting their
tusks.
It is particularly interesting to note today how legitimist circles in Vienna
preen themselves on their work for the restoration of South Tyrol. Seven
years ago their august and illustrious Dynasty helped, by an act of perjury
and treason, to make it possible for the victorious world-coalition to take
away South Tyrol. At that time these circles supported the perfidious policy
adopted by their Dynasty and did not trouble themselves in the least about
the fate of South Tyrol or any other province. Naturally it is easier today
to take up the fight for this territory, since the present struggle is waged
with 'the weapons of the mind'. Anyhow, it is easier to join in a 'meeting
of protestation' and talk yourself hoarse in giving vent to the noble indignation
that fills your breast, or stain your finger with the writing of a newspaper
article, than to blow up a bridge, for instance, during the occupation of
the Ruhr.
The reason why certain circles have made the question of South Tyrol the
pivot of German-Italian relations during the past few years is quite evident.
Jews and Habsburg legitimists are greatly interested in preventing Germany
from pursuing a policy of alliance which might lead one day to the resurgence
of a free German fatherland. It is not out of love for South Tyrol that they
play this role today – for their policy would turn out detrimental
rather than helpful to the interests of that province – but through
fear of an agreement being established between Germany and Italy.
A tendency towards lying and calumny lies in the nature of these people,
and that explains how they can calmly and brazenly attempt to twist things
in such a way as to make it appear that we have 'betrayed' South Tyrol.
There is one clear answer that must be given to these gentlemen. It is this:
Tyrol has been betrayed, in the first place, by every German who was sound
in limb and body and did not offer himself for service at the Front during
1914–1918 to do his duty towards his country.
In the second place, Tyrol was betrayed by every man who, during those years
did not help to reinforce the national spirit and the national powers of
resistance, so as to enable the country to carry through the War and keep
up the fight to the very end.
In the third place, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone who took part in
the November Revolution, either directly by his act or indirectly by a cowardly
toleration of it, and thus broke the sole weapon that could have saved South
Tyrol.
In the fourth place, South Tyrol was betrayed by those parties and their
adherents who put their signatures to the disgraceful treaties of Versailles
and St. Germain.
And so the matter stands, my brave gentlemen, who make your protests only
with words.
To-day I am guided by a calm and cool recognition of the fact that the lost
territories cannot be won back by the whetted tongues of parliamentary spouters
but only by the whetted sword; in other words, through a fight where blood
will have to be shed.
Now, I have no hesitations in saying that today, once the die has been cast,
it is not only impossible to win back South Tyrol through a war but I should
definitely take my stand against such a movement, because I am convinced
that it would not be possible to arouse the national enthusiasm of the German
people and maintain it in such a way as would be necessary in order to carry
through such a war to a successful issue. On the contrary, I believe that
if we have to shed German blood once again it would be criminal to do so
for the sake of liberating 200,000 Germans, when more than seven million
neighbouring Germans are suffering under foreign domination and a vital artery
of the German nation has become a playground for hordes of African negros.
If the German nation is to put an end to a state of things which threatens
to wipe it off the map of Europe it must not fall into the errors of the
pre-War period and make the whole world its enemy. But it must ascertain
who is its most dangerous enemy so that it can concentrate all its forces
in a struggle to beat him. And if, in order to carry through this struggle
to victory, sacrifices should be made in other quarters, future generations
will not condemn us for that. They will take account of the miseries and
anxieties which led us to make such a bitter decision, and in the light of
that consideration they will more clearly recognize the brilliancy of our
success.
Again I must say here that we must always be guided by the fundamental principle
that, as a preliminary to winning back lost provinces, the political independence
and strength of the motherland must first be restored.
The first task which has to be accomplished is to make that independence
possible and to secure it by a wise policy of alliances, which presupposes
an energetic management of our public affairs.
But it is just on this point that we, National Socialists, have to guard
against being dragged into the tow of our ranting bourgeois patriots who
take their cue from the Jew. It would be a disaster if, instead of preparing
for the coming struggle, our Movement also were to busy itself with mere
protests by word of mouth.
It was the fantastic idea of a Nibelungen alliance with the decomposed body
of the Habsburg State that brought about Germany's ruin. Fantastic sentimentality
in dealing with the possibilities of foreign policy today would be the best
means of preventing our revival for innumerable years to come.
Here I must briefly answer the objections which may be raised in regard to
the three questions I have put.
1. Is it possible at all to form an alliance with the present Germany, whose
weakness is so visible to all eyes?
2. Can the ex-enemy nations change their attitude towards Germany?
3. In other nations is not the influence of Jewry stronger than the recognition
of their own interests, and does not this influence thwart all their good
intentions and render all their plans futile?
I think that I have already dealt adequately with one of the two aspects
of the first point. Of course nobody will enter into an alliance with the
present Germany. No Power in the world would link its fortunes with a State
whose government does not afford grounds for the slightest confidence. As
regards the attempt which has been made by many of our compatriots to explain
the conduct of the Government by referring to the woeful state of public
feeling and thus excuse such conduct, I must strongly object to that way
of looking at things.
The lack of character which our people have shown during the last six years
is deeply distressing. The indifference with which they have treated the
most urgent necessities of our nation might veritably lead one to despair.
Their cowardice is such that it often cries to heaven for vengeance. But
one must never forget that we are dealing with a people who gave to the world,
a few years previously, an admirable example of the highest human qualities.
From the first days of August 1914 to the end of the tremendous struggle
between the nations, no people in the world gave a better proof of manly
courage, tenacity and patient endurance, than this people gave who are so
cast down and dispirited today. Nobody will dare to assert that the lack
of character among our people today is typical of them. What we have to
endure today, among us and around us, is due only to the influence of the
sad and distressing effects that followed the high treason committed on November
9th, 1918. More than ever before the word of the poet is true: that evil
can only give rise to evil. But even in this epoch those qualities among
our people which are fundamentally sound are not entirely lost. They slumber
in the depths of the national conscience, and sometimes in the clouded firmament
we see certain qualities like shining lights which Germany will one day remember
as the first symptoms of a revival. We often see young Germans assembling
and forming determined resolutions, as they did in 1914, freely and willingly
to offer themselves as a sacrifice on the altar of their beloved Fatherland.
Millions of men have resumed work, whole-heartedly and zealously, as if no
revolution had ever affected them. The smith is at his anvil once again.
And the farmer drives his plough. The scientist is in his laboratory. And
everybody is once again attending to his duty with the same zeal and devotion
as formerly.
The oppression which we suffer from at the hands of our enemies is no longer
taken, as it formerly was, as a matter for laughter; but it is resented with
bitterness and anger. There can be no doubt that a great change of attitude
has taken place.
This evolution has not yet taken the shape of a conscious intention and movement
to restore the political power and independence of our nation; but the blame
for this must be attributed to those utterly incompetent people who have
no natural endowments to qualify them for statesmanship and yet have been
governing our nation since 1918 and leading it to ruin.
Yes. If anybody accuses our people today he ought to be asked: What is being
done to help them? What are we to say of the poor support which the people
give to any measures introduced by the Government? Is it not true that such
a thing as a Government hardly exists at all? And must we consider the poor
support which it receives as a sign of a lack of vitality in the nation itself;
or is it not rather a proof of the complete failure of the methods employed
in the management of this valuable trust? What have our Governments done
to re-awaken in the nation a proud spirit of self-assertion, up-standing
manliness, and a spirit of righteous defiance towards its enemies?
In 1919, when the Peace Treaty was imposed on the German nation, there were
grounds for hoping that this instrument of unrestricted oppression would
help to reinforce the outcry for the freedom of Germany. Peace treaties which
make demands that fall like a whip-lash on the people turn out not infrequently
to be the signal of a future revival.
To what purpose could the Treaty of Versailles have been exploited?
In the hands of a willing Government, how could this instrument of unlimited
blackmail and shameful humiliation have been applied for the purpose of arousing
national sentiment to its highest pitch? How could a well-directed system
of propaganda have utilized the sadist cruelty of that treaty so as to change
the indifference of the people to a feeling of indignation and transform
that indignation into a spirit of dauntless resistance?
Each point of that Treaty could have been engraved on the minds and hearts
of the German people and burned into them until sixty million men and women
would find their souls aflame with a feeling of rage and shame; and a torrent
of fire would burst forth as from a furnace, and one common will would be
forged from it, like a sword of steel. Then the people would join in the
common cry: "To arms again!"
Yes. A treaty of that kind can be used for such a purpose. Its unbounded
oppression and its impudent demands were an excellent propaganda weapon to
arouse the sluggish spirit of the nation and restore its vitality.
Then, from the child's story-book to the last newspaper in the country, and
every theatre and cinema, every pillar where placards are posted and every
free space on the hoardings should be utilized in the service of this one
great mission, until the faint-hearted cry, "Lord, deliver us," which our
patriotic associations send up to Heaven today would be transformed into
an ardent prayer: "Almighty God, bless our arms when the hour comes. Be just,
as Thou hast always been just. Judge now if we deserve our freedom. Lord,
bless our struggle."
All opportunities were neglected and nothing was done.
Who will be surprised now if our people are not such as they should be or
might be? The rest of the world looks upon us only as its valet, or as a
kindly dog that will lick its master's hand after he has been whipped.
Of course the possibilities of forming alliances with other nations are hampered
by the indifference of our own people, but much more by our Governments.
They have been and are so corrupt that now, after eight years of indescribable
oppression, there exists only a faint desire for liberty.
In order that our nation may undertake a policy of alliances, it must restore
its prestige among other nations, and it must have an authoritative Government
that is not a drudge in the service of foreign States and the taskmaster
of its own people, but rather the herald of the national will.
If our people had a government which would look upon this as its mission,
six years would not have passed before a courageous foreign policy on the
part of the Reich would find a corresponding support among the people, whose
desire for freedom would be encouraged and intensified thereby.
The third objection referred to the difficulty of changing the ex-enemy nations
into friendly allies. That objection may be answered as follows:
The general anti-German psychosis which has developed in other countries
through the war propaganda must of necessity continue to exist as long as
there is not a renaissance of the national conscience among the German people,
so that the German Reich may once again become a State which is able to play
its part on the chess-board of European politics and with whom the others
feel that they can play. Only when the Government and the people feel absolutely
certain of being able to undertake a policy of alliances can one Power or
another, whose interests coincide with ours, think of instituting a system
of propaganda for the purpose of changing public opinion among its own people.
Naturally it will take several years of persevering and ably directed work
to reach such a result. Just because a long period is needed in order to
change the public opinion of a country, it is necessary to reflect calmly
before such an enterprise be undertaken. This means that one must not enter
upon this kind of work unless one is absolutely convinced that it is worth
the trouble and that it will bring results which will be valuable in the
future. One must not try to change the opinions and feelings of a people
by basing one's actions on the vain cajolery of a more or less brilliant
Foreign Minister, but only if there be a tangible guarantee that the new
orientation will be really useful. Otherwise public opinion in the country
dealt with may be just thrown into a state of complete confusion. The most
reliable guarantee that can be given for the possibility of subsequently
entering into an alliance with a certain State cannot be found in the loquacious
suavity of some individual member of the Government, but in the manifest
stability of a definite and practical policy on the part of the Government
as a whole, and in the support which is given to that policy by the public
opinion of the country. The faith of the public in this policy will be
strengthened all the more if the Government organize one active propaganda
to explain its efforts and secure public support for them, and if public
opinion favourably responds to the Government's policy.
Therefore a nation in such a position as ours will be looked upon as a possible
ally if public opinion supports the Government's policy and if both are united
in the same enthusiastic determination to carry through the fight for national
freedom. That condition of affairs must be firmly established before any
attempt can be made to change public opinion in other countries which, for
the sake of defending their most elementary interests, are disposed to take
the road shoulder-to-shoulder with a companion who seems able to play his
part in defending those interests. In other words, this means that they will
be ready to establish an alliance.
For this purpose, however, one thing is necessary. Seeing that the task of
bringing about a radical change in the public opinion of a country calls
for hard work, and many do not at first understand what it means, it would
be both foolish and criminal to commit mistakes which could be used as weapons
in the hands of those who are opposed to such a change.
One must recognize the fact that it takes a long time for a people to understand
completely the inner purposes which a Government has in view, because it
is not possible to explain the ultimate aims of the preparations that are
being made to carry through a certain policy. In such cases the Government
has to count on the blind faith of the masses or the intuitive instinct of
the ruling caste that is more developed intellectually. But since many people
lack this insight, this political acumen and faculty for seeing into the
trend of affairs, and since political considerations forbid a public explanation
of why such and such a course is being followed, a certain number of leaders
in intellectual circles will always oppose new tendencies which, because
they are not easily grasped, can be pointed to as mere experiments. And that
attitude arouses opposition among conservative circles regarding the measures
in question.
For this reason a strict duty devolves upon everybody not to allow any weapon
to fall into the hands of those who would interfere with the work of bringing
about a mutual understanding with other nations. This is specially so in
our case, where we have to deal with the pretentions and fantastic talk of
our patriotic associations and our small bourgeoisie who talk politics in
the cafes. That the cry for a new war fleet, the restoration of our colonies,
etc., has no chance of ever being carried out in practice will not be denied
by anyone who thinks over the matter calmly and seriously. These harmless
and sometimes half-crazy spouters in the war of protests are serving the
interests of our mortal enemy, while the manner in which their vapourings
are exploited for political purposes in England cannot be considered as
advantageous to Germany.
They squander their energies in futile demonstrations against the whole world.
These demonstrations are harmful to our interests and those who indulge in
them forget the fundamental principle which is a preliminary condition of
all success. What thou doest, do it thoroughly. Because we keep on howling
against five or ten States we fail to concentrate all the forces of our national
will and our physical strength for a blow at the heart of our bitterest enemy.
And in this way we sacrifice the possibility of securing an alliance which
would reinforce our strength for that decisive conflict.
Here, too, there is a mission for National Socialism to fulfil. It must teach
our people not to fix their attention on the little things but rather on
the great things, not to exhaust their energies on secondary objects, and
not to forget that the object we shall have to fight for one day is the bare
existence of our people and that the sole enemy we shall have to strike at
is that Power which is robbing us of this existence.
It may be that we shall have many a heavy burden to bear. But this is by
no means an excuse for refusing to listen to reason and raise nonsensical
outcries against the rest of the world, instead of concentrating all our
forces against the most deadly enemy.
Moreover, the German people will have no moral right to complain of the manner
in which the rest of the world acts towards them, as long as they themselves
have not called to account those criminals who sold and betrayed their own
country. We cannot hope to be taken very seriously if we indulge in long-range
abuse and protests against England and Italy and then allow those scoundrels
to circulate undisturbed in our own country who were in the pay of the enemy
war propaganda, took the weapons out of our hands, broke the backbone of
our resistance and bartered away the Reich for thirty pieces of silver.
The enemy did only what was expected. And we ought to learn from the stand
he took and the way he acted.
Anyone who cannot rise to the level of this outlook must reflect that otherwise
there would remain nothing else than to renounce the idea of adopting any
policy of alliances for the future. For if we cannot form an alliance with
England because she has robbed us of our colonies, or with Italy because
she has taken possession of South Tyrol, or with Poland or Czechoslovakia,
then there remains no other possibility of an alliance in Europe except with
France which, inter alia, has robbed us of Alsace and Lorraine.
There can scarcely be any doubt as to whether this last alternative would
be advantageous to the interests of the German people. But if it be defended
by somebody one is always doubtful whether that person be merely a simpleton
or an astute rogue.
As far as concerns the leaders in these activities, I think the latter hypothesis
is true.
A change in public feeling among those nations which have hitherto been enemies
and whose true interests will correspond in the future with ours could be
effected, as far as human calculation goes, if the internal strength of our
State and our manifest determination to secure our own existence made it
clear that we should be valuable allies. Moreover, it is necessary that our
incompetent way of doing things and our criminal conduct in some matters
should not furnish grounds which may be utilized for purposes of propaganda
by those who would oppose our projects of establishing an alliance with one
or other of our former enemies.
The answer to the third question is still more difficult: Is it conceivable
that they who represent the true interests of those nations which may possibly
form an alliance with us could put their views into practice against the
will of the Jew, who is the mortal enemy of national and independent popular
States?
For instance, could the motive-forces of Great Britain's traditional
statesmanship smash the disastrous influence of the Jew, or could they not?
This question, as I have already said, is very difficult to answer. The answer
depends on so many factors that it is impossible to form a conclusive judgment.
Anyhow, one thing is certain: The power of the Government in a given State
and at a definite period may be so firmly established in the public estimation
and so absolutely at the service of the country's interests that the forces
of international Jewry could not possibly organize a real and effective
obstruction against measures considered to be politically necessary.
The fight which Fascist Italy waged against Jewry's three principal weapons,
the profound reasons for which may not have been consciously understood (though
I do not believe this myself) furnishes the best proof that the poison fangs
of that Power which transcends all State boundaries are being drawn, even
though in an indirect way. The prohibition of Freemasonry and secret societies,
the suppression of the supernational Press and the definite abolition of
Marxism, together with the steadily increasing consolidation of the Fascist
concept of the State – all this will enable the Italian Government,
in the course of some years, to advance more and more the interests of the
Italian people without paying any attention to the hissing of the Jewish
world-hydra.
The English situation is not so favourable. In that country which has 'the
freest democracy' the Jew dictates his will, almost unrestrained but indirectly,
through his influence on public opinion. And yet there is a perpetual struggle
in England between those who are entrusted with the defence of State interests
and the protagonists of Jewish world-dictatorship.
After the War it became clear for the first time how sharp this contrast
is, when British statesmanship took one stand on the Japanese problem and
the Press took a different stand.
Just after the War had ceased the old mutual antipathy between America and
Japan began to reappear. Naturally the great European Powers could not remain
indifferent to this new war menace. In England, despite the ties of kinship,
there was a certain amount of jealousy and anxiety over the growing importance
of the United States in all spheres of international economics and politics.
What was formerly a colonial territory, the daughter of a great mother, seemed
about to become the new mistress of the world. It is quite understandable
that today England should re-examine her old alliances and that British
statesmanship should look anxiously to the danger of a coming moment when
the cry would no longer be: "Britain rules the waves", but rather: "The Seas
belong to the United States".
The gigantic North American State, with the enormous resources of its virgin
soil, is much more invulnerable than the encircled German Reich. Should a
day come when the die which will finally decide the destinies of the nations
will have to be cast in that country, England would be doomed if she stood
alone. Therefore she eagerly reaches out her hand to a member of the yellow
race and enters an alliance which, from the racial point of view is perhaps
unpardonable; but from the political viewpoint it represents the sole possibility
of reinforcing Britain's world position in face of the strenuous developments
taking place on the American continent.
Despite the fact that they fought side by side on the European battlefields,
the British Government did not decide to conclude an alliance with the Asiatic
partner, yet the whole Jewish Press opposed the idea of a Japanese alliance.
How can we explain the fact that up to 1918 the Jewish Press championed the
policy of the British Government against the German Reich and then suddenly
began to take its own way and showed itself disloyal to the Government?
It was not in the interests of Great Britain to have Germany annihilated,
but primarily a Jewish interest. And today the destruction of Japan would
serve British political interests less than it would serve the far-reaching
intentions of those who are leading the movement that hopes to establish
a Jewish world-empire. While England is using all her endeavours to maintain
her position in the world, the Jew is organizing his aggressive plans for
the conquest of it.
He already sees the present European States as pliant instruments in his
hands, whether indirectly through the power of so-called Western Democracy
or in the form of a direct domination through Russian Bolshevism. But it
is not only the old world that he holds in his snare; for a like fate threatens
the new world. Jews control the financial forces of America on the stock
exchange. Year after year the Jew increases his hold on Labour in a nation
of 120 million souls. But a very small section still remains quite independent
and is thus the cause of chagrin to the Jew.
The Jews show consummate skill in manipulating public opinion and using it
as an instrument in fighting for their own future.
The great leaders of Jewry are confident that the day is near at hand when
the command given in the Old Testament will be carried out and the Jews will
devour the other nations of the earth.
Among this great mass of denationalized countries which have become Jewish
colonies one independent State could bring about the ruin of the whole structure
at the last moment. The reason for doing this would be that Bolshevism as
a world-system cannot continue to exist unless it encompasses the whole earth.
Should one State preserve its national strength and its national greatness
the empire of the Jewish satrapy, like every other tyranny, would have to
succumb to the force of the national idea.
As a result of his millennial experience in accommodating himself to surrounding
circumstances, the Jew knows very well that he can undermine the existence
of European nations by a process of racial bastardization, but that he could
hardly do the same to a national Asiatic State like Japan. To-day he can
ape the ways of the German and the Englishman, the American and the Frenchman,
but he has no means of approach to the yellow Asiatic. Therefore he seeks
to destroy the Japanese national State by using other national States as
his instruments, so that he may rid himself of a dangerous opponent before
he takes over supreme control of the last national State and transforms that
control into a tyranny for the oppression of the defenceless.
He does not want to see a national Japanese State in existence when he founds
his millennial empire of the future, and therefore he wants to destroy it
before establishing his own dictatorship.
And so he is busy today in stirring up antipathy towards Japan among the
other nations, as he stirred it up against Germany. Thus it may happen that
while British statesmanship is still endeavouring to ground its policy in
the alliance with Japan, the Jewish Press in Great Britain may be at the
same time leading a hostile movement against that ally and preparing for
a war of destruction by pretending that it is for the triumph of democracy
and at the same time raising the war-cry: Down with Japanese militarism and
imperialism.
Thus in England today the Jew opposes the policy of the State. And for this
reason the struggle against the Jewish world-danger will one day begin also
in that country.
And here again the National Socialist Movement has a tremendous task before
it.
It must open the eyes of our people in regard to foreign nations and it must
continually remind them of the real enemy who menaces the world today. In
place of preaching hatred against Aryans from whom we may be separated on
almost every other ground but with whom the bond of kindred blood and the
main features of a common civilization unite us, we must devote ourselves
to arousing general indignation against the maleficent enemy of humanity
and the real author of all our sufferings.
The National Socialist Movement must see to it that at least in our own country
the mortal enemy is recognized and that the fight against him may be a beacon
light pointing to a new and better period for other nations as well as showing
the way of salvation for Aryan humanity in the struggle for its existence.
Finally, may reason be our guide and will-power our strength. And may the
sacred duty of directing our conduct as I have pointed out give us perseverance
and tenacity; and may our faith be our supreme protection.